Soltane v. US Dept Justice

Opinions of the United
2004 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

8-26-2004

Soltane v. US Dept Justice
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 03-1626

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PRECEDENTIAL (Opinion Filed: August 26, 2004)

UNITED STATES COURT OF LAWRENCE H. RUDNICK (Argued)
APPEALS 1608 Walnut Street, Suite 1500
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT Philadelphia, PA 19103
____________
Counsel for Appellant
No. 03-1626
____________ PATRICK L. MEEHAN
LAURIE MAGID
CAMPHILL SOLTANE, VIRGINIA A. GIBSON
SUSAN R. BECKER (Argued)
Appellant 615 Chestnut Street, Suite 1250
Philadelphia, PA 19106
v.
Counsel for Appellee
US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; ____________________
IMMIGRATION &
NATURALIZATION SERVICE OPINION OF THE COURT
___________________ ____________________

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
ALITO, Circuit Judge:
STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF Camphill Soltane (“Camphill”)
PENNSYLVANIA appeals a final order of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of
District Court Judge: Honorable Herbert Pennsylvania affirming the denial of
J. Hutton Camphill’s visa petition on behalf of an
(Civil Action No. 02-0727) employee sought to be classified as a
“special immigrant religious worker.”
________________ Because that denial was predicated on
legal error and improper findings of
Argued: December 5, 2003 evidentiary deficiency, we vacate the
judgment of the District Court and remand
Before: SLOVITER and ALITO, Circuit this case for reconsideration by the agency.
Judges, and OBERDORFER, District
I.
Judge*
Camphill Soltane is a non-profit
organization, dedicated to providing
*
The Honorable Louis F. Oberdorfer, services to young adults with mental
Senior District Judge for the District of disabilities. Rooted in “Anthroposophy”
Columbia, sitting by designation. and the teachings of Rudolph Steiner,
Camphill seeks to create a spiritual the training process and the religious
community through cooperative life, social nature of the position, see App. II at 59-61,
interaction, and spiritual activity. “The as well as a set of literature (some
Camphill Movement is focused on authored by Steiner) that discussed
Christianizing the ordinary aspects of life Anthroposophy and the “C amphill
for the mentally handicapped as well as for M ovem ent” a nd was presumably
the fully able members of the community submitted as representative training
. . . .” Appellant Br. at 6. material. See App. II at 62-146.2
No twiths tanding the su pplem enta l
Since 1996, the Chester County
submissions, the INS denied Camphill’s
facility of Camphill has employed
petition in February 2001, finding that
Annagret Goetze, a citizen and native of
Camphill had failed to establish that
Germany. Goetze was originally admitted
Goetze was to be employed in a religious
into the United States in the R-1
occupation, as required under the
classification as a nonimmigrant religious
regulations. App. I at 31.
worker. In 2000, Camphill filed an I-360
immigrant visa petition on behalf of Camphill filed a timely appeal with
Goetze with the Immigration and the Administrative Appeals Unit. In
Naturalization Service (INS). 1 This December 2001, a final administrative
petition sought to have Goetze classified d e c i s io n w a s r e n d e r e d b y t h e
as a special immigrant religious worker so Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) of
that she could serve in the proposed the INS. Reviewing the record de novo,
position of houseparent, music instructor, the AAO affirmed on four independent
and religious instructor at the Camphill grounds, any one of which alone could
facility. have justified the denial: (1) Camphill did
not qualify as a religious organization as
The Vermont Servicing Center of
required by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(C); (2)
the INS made a request for further
the proposed position of houseparent was
evidence showing that Goetze had two
neither a religious occupation nor a
years of experience in a religious
religious vocation; (3) there was
occupation and that she had received
insufficient evidence to determine whether
specific religious training. App. I at 32.
Goetze had worked in a religious position
Camphill responded with explanations of
for two years preceding the petition; and
(4) Cam phill provided insufficient
evidence to prove that there was a
1
The INS has ceased to exist as of
March 1, 2003, and has been replaced by
2
the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration For example, App. II at 86 is a sheet
Services. We nevertheless use the term labeled “Study Material” listing several
INS throughout this opinion (as do the sources, some of which appear to be
briefs) for the sake of consistency. included in the administrative record.

2
qualifying tender of a job to Goetze. Id. In this case, the statutory basis for
Camphill’s visa request was 8 U.S.C.
Camphill appealed for review of the
§ 1153(b)(4), which governs the issuance
AAO decision in the Eastern District of
of preference visas to “certain special
Pennsylvania, under the Administrative
immigrants,” including those engaged in a
Procedure Act (APA). In February 2003,
“religious occupation or vocation,” see id.
the District Court entered judgment against
§ 1101(a)(27)(C)(ii). If the AAO’s denial
Camphill, affirming the AAO decision on
of Camphill’s visa request constituted a
all four grounds. This appeal followed.
“decision or action of the Attorney General
II. the authority for which is specified under
this title to be in the discretion of the
As a preliminary matter, we are
A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l ,” t h e n un d e r
required to consider the issue of subject
§ 1251(a)(2)(B)(ii) the District Court
matter jurisdiction, even though neither
lacked jurisdiction to review the agency
party contends that it is lacking here. See
action.
Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist.,
475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986) (“[E]very federal The key to § 1251(a)(2)(B)(ii) lies
appellate court has a special obligation to in its requirement that the discretion giving
satisfy itself not only of its own rise to the jurisdictional bar must be
jurisdiction, but also that of the lower “specified” by statute. In other words,
courts in a cause under review, even “the language of the statute in question
though the parties are prepared to concede must provide the discretionary authority”
it.”) (internal quotes omitted). The before the bar can have any effect.
jurisdictional question in this case centers Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States,
on 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which 345 F.3d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 2003). For
provides in pertinent part: example, in Spencer Enterprises, the Ninth
Circuit found no discretion specified in a
Notwithstanding any other
statute that listed “clear[] . . . eligibility
provision of law, no court
requirements” with instructions that a visa
shall have jurisdiction to
“shall” issue when those requirements are
review . . . any other
met. By contrast, in Urena-Tavarez v.
decision or action of the
Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2004), we
Atto rney Ge neral th e
found that the statute at issue “explicitly
authority for which is
assign[ed]” discretion to the Attorney
specified under this title [8
General, focusing on the use of specific
U.S.C. §§ 1151 et seq.] to
language to that end (“discretion” and
be in the discretion of the
“sole discre tion”), to geth er w ith
Attorney General, other than
instructions that certain actions “may” (as
the granting of relief under
opposed to “shall”) be taken when any of
[8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)]
the enumerated conditions is satisfied.
[governing asylum].

3
 The statute at issue in this case admission, has been a
provides: member of a religious
denomination having a bona
Visas shall be made
fide nonprofit, religious
available, in a number not to
organization in the United
exceed 7.1 percent of such
States;
w o rl dw id e leve l, to
qualified special immigrants (ii) seeks to enter the
described in [8 U.S.C. § United States–
1101(a)(27)] (other than
(I) solly for the purpose
those described in
of carrying on the vocation
subparagraph (A) or (B)
of a minister of that
thereof), of which not more
religious denomination,
than 5,000 may be made
available in any fiscal year (II) before October 1,
to sp e ci al im migrants 2008, in order to work for
described in subclause (II) the organization at the
or (III) of [8 U.S.C. § request of the organization
1101(a)(27)(C)(ii)(II) or in a professional capacity in
(III)], and not more than 100 a religious vocation or
may be made available in occupation, or
any fiscal year to special
(III) before October 1,
i m migra n t s , e x c ludin g
2008, in order to work for
spouses and children, who
the organization (or for a
are described in [8 U.S.C. §
bona fide o rganization
1101(a)(27)(M)].
which is affiliated with the
8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(4) (emphasis added). religious denomination and
is exempt from taxation as
A “special immigrant,” as that
an organization described in
classification pertains to ministers and
section 501(c)(3) of the
other religious workers, is defined as:
Internal Revenue Code of
(C) an immigrant, 1986) at the request of the
and the immigrant's spouse organization in a religious
and children if vocation or occupation; and
accompanying or following
(iii) has been
to join the immigrant, who–
carrying on such vocation,
(i) for at least 2 professional work, or other
years immediately preceding work continuously for at
the time of application for least the 2-year period

4
 described in clause (i); marginally ambiguous statutory language,
without more, is adequate to “specific[y]”
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(C).
that a particular action is within the
The language of 8 U.S.C. Attorney General’s discretion for the
§ 1153(b)(4) makes clear that the Attorney purposes of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). Of
General is required to grant preference course, in a sense, an agency generally has
visas to those who fall within certain “discretion” under Chevron to interpret
numerical limits and qualify as “special ambiguous language used in a statute it
immigrants” under § 1101(a)(27). These administers. But if that sort of ubiquitous
relevant numerical limits are set by statute, “discretion” were sufficient by itself to
see 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(4), and the satisfy § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), the effects of
definition of “special immigrant” (as that jurisdictional bar would be sweeping
relevant to religious workers) is fairly indeed. We do not believe that Congress
detailed and specific, with no explicit intended such a result. 3
reference to “discretion” as in Urena-
For these reasons, we hold that a
Tavarez. In fact, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(4)
preference visa determination under
bears some similarity to the neighboring
§ 1153(b)(4) is not a “decision or action of
provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5), which
the Attorney General the authority for
was analyzed in Spencer Enterprises, in
which is specified under this title to be in
that it sets forth specific eligibility
the discretion of the Attorney General.”
requirements, with instructions that the
The jurisdictional bar of
visa “shall” issue if those requirements are
§ 1252( a ) (2 ) ( B ) ( ii ) is t h e re f o re
met. Accordingly, we do not read
inapplicable in this case.
§ 1153(b)(4) as having “specified” that the
granting of the visas in question “be in the
discretion of the Attorney General.” 3
Furthermore, if “discretion” under
We note that the dissent in Spencer § 1251(a)(2)(B)(ii) means nothing more
Enterprises criticized the majority in that than the “application of facts to
case for what it believed was an overly principles,” see Spencer Enterprises, 345
“mechanical” approach, including reliance F.3d at 699 (Beezer, J., dissenting), then it
on the semantic distinction between “may” is hard to imagine any action by the
and “shall.” See Spencer Enterprises, 345 Attorney General under the relevant title
F.3d at 696-98. (Beezer, J., dissenting). that would not be deemed discretionary.
We agree that the question of whether For example, the substantial evidence
discretionary authority has been specified standard under which we review many
by statute should be considered by immigration actions contemplates that in
examining the statute as a whole. But we some cases there will be a range of
do not think (as the Spencer Enterprises acceptable outcomes among which an
dissent goes on to suggest) that the use of adjudicator might reasonably choose. 8
U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

5
 III. A.
We now turn to the merits of the We first consider the question
appeal. Under the Administrative whether Camphill qualifies as a “religious
Procedure Act, we will reverse agency organization” under § 1101(a)(27)(C).
action if it is “arbitrary, capricious, [or] an The associated regulation at 8 C.F.R.
abuse of discretion,” or “unsupported by § 204.5(m)(3) mandates that petitioners
substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 706; prove eligibility for tax-exempt status
Spencer Enterprises, 345 F.3d at 693. We under “section 501(c)(3) of the Internal
defer to both formal and informal agency Revenue Code of 1986 as it relates to
interpretations of an ambiguous regulation religious organizations.” Id. The AAO
unless those interpretations are “plainly held that “[o]nly organizations classified,
erroneous or inconsistent with the or classifiable, as ‘churches’ . . . are
regulation.” Bowles v. Seminole Rock & qualifying religious organizations for the
Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945); Thomas purpose of special immigrant religious
Jefferson University v. Shalala, 512 U.S. worker classification.” App. I at 25.
504, 512 (1994); Auer v. Robbins, 519
The government later informed the
U.S. 452 (1997).4
Court that “the agency [was] in the process
of issuing a memorandum that . . .
4 broadens its interpretation of when an
We need not decide whether the AAO
organization may qualify as a ‘bona fide
adjudication in this case is best
religious organization,’” and that it
characterized as “formal” or “informal,”
therefore desired to withdraw its argument
since the outcome in terms of deference is
that Camphill had not qualified for the
the same. See Caruso v. Blockbuster-Sony
special immigration visa on the ground
Music Entertainment Ctr., 193 F.3d 730,
that it was not a “church.” Appellee Letter
733 (3rd Cir. 1999); Scott H. Angstreich,
Br. at 1. 5 We accept this concession, and
Shoring Up Chevron: A Defense of
Seminole Rock Deference to Agency
Regulatory Interpretations, 34 U.C. Davis (2001) (agency’s informal interpretation of
L. Rev. 49, 56 (2000) (“[A]n interpretation a statutory ambiguity does not merit
of a regulation in a format lacking the Chevron deference).
force of law warrants Chevron-style
5
deference, but such an interpretation of a See William R. Yates, U.S. Citizenship
statute does not.”); Note, 114 Harv. L. and Immigration Services, Extension of
Rev. 359, 377-78 (2000) (“The Auer Court the Special Immigrant Religious Worker
. . . held that agencies can issue Program and Clarification of Tax Exempt
authoritative interpretations of their own Status Requirements for R eligious
ambiguous regulations outside [the Organizations (December 17, 2003),
procedural] strictures [of the APA].”); cf. availa ble a t h t t p :/ / w w w . i l w . co m /
U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227-29 lawyers/immigdaily/doj_news/2004,0113

6
therefore proceed under the assumption facilities, missionaries,
that Camphill qualifies as a “religious religious translators, or
organization.” religious broadcasters. This
group does not include
B.
janitors, main tenance
We next consider whether the AAO w orkers, clerks, f u n d
decision can be affirmed on the ground raisers, or persons solely
that the proposed position of houseparent involved in the solicitation
is not a “religious occupation.” 6 This term of donations.
is defined by regulation as follows:
8 C.F.R. § 204.5(m)(2) (emphasis added).
Religious occupation means The AAO found that the “duties of the
an activity which relates to position [of houseparent] involve the care
a traditio nal re ligious of the mentally handicapped,” and that
function. Exa mp les of “[s]uch duties are considered a wholly
individuals in religious secular function, even if the facility is
occupations include, but are operated by a charitable organization
not limited to, liturgical founded on religious principles.” App. I at
workers, religious 26. The AAO further explained that “[t]he
i n s t r u c t o r s , r e l ig i o u s service interprets the pertinent regulations
counselors, cantors, to require that such positions are
catechists, workers in traditionally full-time salaried positions
r e ligious hospitals o r requiring specific religious or theological
r e l i g i o u s h e a l th c a re training,” and that Camphill had failed to
show that the position of houseparent
satisfied this definition. Id. On appeal,
-religiouswker.pdf. Camphill argues that the INS erred in
interpreting § 204.5(m)(2) in a manner that
6
Camphill originally argued that excluded the position in which Goetze was
Goetze’s position also constituted a to serve.
“religious vocation,” as that term is
We agree with Camphill that the
defined in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(m)(2). The
AAO improperly applied the regulation in
AAO rejected that position, and Camphill
this case. The characterization of Goetze’s
does not appear to challenge that
position as not “relat[ing] to a traditional
determination on appeal. Aside from a
religious function” suggests that the
passing reference to the “religious
conclusion was predetermined. The AAO
vocation” term in its brief, Camphill’s
first described what Goetze did in terms
argument is centered entirely on the
that excluded any mention of the religious
meaning of the term “religious
component of her duties—saying that her
occupation.” See Appellant Br. at 23-28;
job was to care for the mentally
Appellant Reply Br. at 8-15.

7
handicapped—and then concluded that she “religious occupation” involve only
was performing a secular function because religious functions, we believe that its
its own characterization of what she was interpretation is inconsistent with the text
doing was secular. The same approach of the regulation and other indications of
could be used as a basis for concluding the agency’s intent and is accordingly not
that most of the positions explicitly listed entitled to deference. Thomas Jefferson,
in the regulation are secular. For example, 512 U.S. at 512.
§ 204.5(m)(2) mentions “religious
Alternatively, if the AAO’s
translators,” who might be described as
decision is read as finding that the position
performing the function of translation, a
of houseparent involved only secular
“secular” activity. Similarly, “religious
functions, we do not find that conclusion
counselors” perform the function of
supported by substantial evidence of
counseling troubled individuals, which
record. Camphill consistently testified that
could also be characterized as secular.
Goetze’s position involved a number of
Accordingly, we believe the AAO’s
clearly religious responsibilities, including
analytic approach is inconsistent with the
“imbuing residents with the religious
text of the regulation.
values and practices of Camphill[;]
We note that the regulation conducting house-based ac tivities,
specifically excludes certain workers, such including practical chores, prayer, festival
as “janitors” and “maintenance workers,” celebrations and Bible readings[;]
who perform wholly secular functions, but instructing other staff in the practices and
this does not mean that a person cannot Christian values of Camphill life[;] [and]
qualify as having a “religious occupation” [t]eaching religious subjects and values to
if the worker’s job includes both secular mentally retarded young adults.” App. I at
and religious aspects. In this vein, we note 35. Moreover, the religious texts included
that the commentary accompanying the in the administrative record, including
promulgation of § 204.5(m)(2) provides transcripts from a series of lectures entitled
that “[i]f [a] job has no religious “Curative Education,” App. II at 62-85,
significance, then the fact that a person is appear to provide some support for
a member of a religious denomination Camphill’s contention that even the
working in a facility run by the prescribed manner of care for its mentally
denomination would not by itself make handicapped residents involved religious
that person a religious worker.” 56 Fed. aspects. The AAO did not analyze or
Reg. 66965 (Dec. 27, 1991) (emphasis otherwise engage this evidence, but rather
added). We take this language as stated perfunctorily that Goetze’s duties
suggesting that a job may qualify under the are “wholly secular.” There is little or no
regulation if it has some religious support in the record for that claim.
significance. To the extent that the AAO
Finally, we consider the AAO’s
read § 204.5(m)(2) as requiring that a
position that a “religious occupation” must

8
be a “traditionally full-time salaried shown that the position of houseparent is
position[] requiring specific religious or traditionally a permanent salaried position
theological training.” This interpretation or that the duties of the position require
is similarly questionable. The requirement specific religious training.” App. I at 26.
that the position be “salaried” appears to This is insufficient to constitute substantial
be inconsistent with the list of religious evidence in support of the AAO’s
occupations given in the regulation itself, conclusion.
which includes positions—perhaps most
We need not set forth here a
notably “missionaries”—who do not
definitive test regarding when a job may or
always receive salaries. We further note
may not be characterized as a “religious
that in promulgating the final rules at
occupation.” However, we think it clear
issue, the agency explicitly stated that they
that the AAO has failed to show why the
had been “revised to account more clearly
position offered by Camphill to Goetze in
for uncompensated volunteers, whose
this case does not qualify. Accordingly,
services are engaged but who are not
we cannot sustain the decision of the AAO
technically employees.” 56 Fed. Reg.
on this ground without further evidence or
66965 (Dec. 27, 1991) (emphasis added).
explanation.
With respect to the “full-time” and
C.
“religious or theological training”
requirements, assuming for the sake of The other two reasons underlying
argument that such requirements are the AAO’s denial of Camphill’s visa
consistent with the regulation, we see no application had to do with purported
evidence that the position offered by evidentiary deficiencies. Specifically, the
Camphill would not qualify. Camphill AAO held that Camphill had not proven
indicated to the agency that Goetze’s that Goetze had two years of continuous
responsibilities required at least 80 hours experience in the relevant occupation, see
of labor per week, see App. I at 35, and 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(m)(1), nor had it proven
that she would be working “full-time,” that a “qualifying job offer” had been
without “supplemental employment.” Id. tendered to Goetze, see id. § 204.5(m)(4).
at 36. Camphill also submitted detailed
It is true that Camphill did no more
descriptions of its training process, see
than submit a letter explaining (among
App. II at 59-61, as well as extensive
other things) that Goetze had been
excerpts from its religious texts in
employed by Camphill for four years, see
response to the agency’s request for
App. II at 35, and that she would continue
training curriculum. See App. I at 32;
to receive room, board, medical insurance,
App. II at 62-146. Again, there is no
etc., as compensation for her work, see
suggestion in the AAO’s opinion that this
App. II at 36. On the other hand, the AAO
evidence was ever considered—only the
decision does not explain in any
bald assertion that Camphill had “not
reasonable detail why this evidence was

9
insufficient. The AAO simply states that uncontradicted evidence. See Richard J.
“supporting documentary evidence” Pierce, Jr., 2 Administrative Law Treatise
should have been submitted, and cites § 11.2 at 791 (2002). For example, if the
Matter of Treasure Craft of California, 14 AAO ruling was based on a determination
I. & N. Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972), for that Camphill’s assertions were not
the proposition that the petitioner in visa credible, then there should have been some
proceedings bears the evidentiary burden sort of finding regarding credibility, either
of proof. explicit or implicit. See Tieniber v.
Heckler, 720 F.2d at 1254 (describing
Of course, there is no doubt that
“strict” and “lenient” approaches by
Camphill bore the burden of proof in this
courts); see also Choratch v. Finch, 438
case; again, the critical question is why the
F.2d 342, 343 (3d Cir. 1971) (“We think it
letter presented by Camphill was
is not too much to require that an
insufficient to sustain that burden. In this
administrative decision that a claimant is
respe ct, Treasure Craft is easily
not eligible . . . be supported by explicit
distinguished from this case. There, the
findings of all facts that are essential to the
petitioner went on record as declaring that
conclusion of ineligibility.”). The AAO
competent training in the pottery industry
makes no effort to explain or suggest why
was not available in Mexico. The
it rejected Camphill’s detailed letter
Regional Commissioner deciding the case
explaining the nature of Goetze’s position.
took administrative notice of the fact that
Mexico had a thriving pottery trade, and Furthermore, Camphill notes that
accordingly held that the assertions by the INS regulations place an obligation on the
petitioner were insufficient to sustain the part of the INS to request additional
burden of proof. Here, by contrast, there evidence if that which was already
was no similar administrative notice submitted is deemed insufficient. See 8
opposing Camphill’s documentation to the C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(8) (“where there is no
effect that Goetze did indeed undergo evidence of ineligibility, and initial
significant religiou s training, was evidence or eligibility information is
employed by Camphill for two years, and missing or the Service finds that the
had been extended a job offer. evidence submitted either does not fully
establish eligibility for the requested
“ A n agency's rejection of
benefit or raises underlying questions
uncontradicted testimony can support a
regarding eligibility, the Service shall
finding of substantial evidence.” Tieniber
request the missing initial evidence”)
v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 1251, 1254 (11th Cir.
(emphasis added).7 The INS does not
1983); see also NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co.,
369 U.S. 404, 408 (1962). However, an
agency is generally under at least a 7
For example, although the AAO
minimal obligation to provide adequate
mentions that Camphill might have
reasons explaining why it has rejected
submitted Goetze’s tax documents to show

10
provide any explanation, either in the
AAO ruling or in its brief on appeal, as to
why this regulation would be inapplicable
in this case.
Because the AAO’s rejection of the
evidence regarding Goetze’s work
experience and job offer does not appear
to be supported by substantial evidence,
we conclude that the AAO decision may
not be sustained on these grounds without
further evidence or explanation.
IV.
None of the arguments advanced by
the AAO in support of the visa denial
withstand scrutiny on appeal. The AAO
clearly did not “consider[] all relevant
[evidentiary] factors” in this case, Florida
Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S.
729, 744 (1985), nor did it properly
interpret its regulation defining “religious
occupation.” The “proper course” is
therefore to “remand to the agency for
additional investigation or explanation.”
Id.

that she had been employed full-time by
C a m p h i l l w i t h o u t e n g ag i n g in
supplemental employment, see App. I at
27, it is clear that the initial request for
additional evidence issued by the INS,
while it demanded several items of
information from Camphill, did not make
any demand for tax documents. App. I at
32.

11