Ren v. Barr

17-43 (L)
Ren v. Barr
BIA
Wright, IJ
A205 894 915
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
4 New York, on the 21st day of May, two thousand nineteen.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
8 DENNIS JACOBS,
9 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _____________________________________
12
13 WEI LIANG REN,
14 Petitioner,
15
16 v. 17-43 (L),
17 17-2566 (Con)
18 NAC
19 WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES
20 ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21 Respondent.
22 _____________________________________
23
24 FOR PETITIONER: Zhong Yue Zhang, Flushing, NY.
25
26 FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant
27 Attorney General; Jeffery R.
28 Leist, Senior Litigation Counsel;
29 Abigail E. Leach, Trial Attorney,
30 Office of Immigration Litigation,
31 United States Department of
32 Justice, Washington, DC.
 1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of these petitions for review of

2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decisions, it is hereby

3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petitions for review

4 are DENIED.

5 Petitioner Wei Liang Ren, a native and citizen of the

6 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a December 12,

7 2016, decision of the BIA affirming a June 7, 2016, decision

8 of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Ren’s application for

9 asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the

10 Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Wei Liang Ren, No.

11 A 205 894 915 (B.I.A. Dec. 12, 2016), aff’g No. A 205 894 915

12 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City June 7, 2016). Ren also seeks review

13 of an August 11, 2017, decision of the BIA denying his motion

14 to reopen. In re Wei Liang Ren, No. A 205 894 915 (B.I.A.

15 Aug. 11, 2017). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

16 underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

17 We have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions.

18 See Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009).

19 The applicable standards of review are well established. See

20 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Wei Sun v. Sessions, 883 F.3d 23,

21 27 (2d Cir. 2018) (reviewing factual findings for substantial

22 evidence and questions of law and the application of law to

2
1 undisputed facts de novo); Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d

2 138, 168-69 (2d Cir. 2008) (reviewing the BIA’s denial of a

3 motion to reopen for abuse of discretion and its country

4 conditions determination for substantial evidence).

5 Ren applied for asylum based on his membership and

6 participation in the China Democracy Party (“CDP”) while in

7 the United States and moved to reopen his proceedings based

8 on his practice of Christianity in the United States. We

9 address the denial of each claim in turn and find no error in

10 the agency’s decisions because the agency balanced relevant

11 factors: the likelihood that the Chinese government is aware

12 of Ren’s U.S. activities, evidence suggesting that he would

13 be targeted if returned to China, and practical concerns,

14 including the fact that Ren commenced both his political

15 activities and his practice of Christianity after he came to

16 the United States. See Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 325, 338 (2d

17 Cir. 2013).

18 CDP Claim

19 Ren had the burden of proving a well-founded fear of

20 persecution on account of his political activity. See 8

21 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1), (2). To

22 do this, he was required to show that he subjectively feared

3
1 persecution and that his fear was objectively reasonable.

2 Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004);

3 Jian Xing Huang v. U.S. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005)

4 (“In the absence of solid support in the record,” an asylum

5 applicant’s fear of persecution is “speculative at best”).

6 He had to show either a “reasonable possibility that he . .

7 . would be singled out individually for persecution,” or that

8 there is a “pattern or practice” of persecution of “persons

9 similarly situated” to him. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii);

10 see also Y.C., 741 F.3d at 332. When as here an applicant

11 applies for “relief based exclusively on activities

12 undertaken after his arrival in the United States, [he] must

13 make some showing that authorities in his country of

14 nationality are (1) aware of his activities or (2) likely to

15 become aware of his activities.” Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey,

16 528 F.3d 135, 138 (2d Cir. 2008).

17 The agency reasonably determined that Ren’s testimony,

18 (sparse) documentary evidence, and the background evidence on

19 China did not establish that the Chinese government was or

20 would likely become aware of his activities. Ren’s evidence

21 of the government’s awareness of his activities in the United

22 States consisted solely of a letter from his wife. The agency

4
1 was not required to credit Ren’s wife’s statement. See Y.C.,

2 741 F.3d at 334 (affirming agency’s determination that letter

3 from spouse in China—stating that he had been visited by

4 police who were aware of applicant’s prodemocracy activities

5 in the United States—was entitled to limited weight because

6 it was unsworn and submitted by an interested witness).

7 Moreover, the country conditions evidence did not support

8 Ren’s fear. Ren submitted the State Department report for

9 2014, which shows that China detains and mistreats political

10 dissidents who are active in China. The report, however, did

11 not identify any targeting of individuals who had engaged in

12 prodemocracy activism in the United States. Accordingly, the

13 agency did not err in concluding that Ren failed to establish

14 a well-founded fear of future persecution. See Jian Xing

15 Huang, 421 F.3d at 129; Ramsameachire, 357 F.3d at 178.

16 Because Ren failed to carry his burden of proof for asylum,

17 he necessarily failed to sustain the higher burdens for

18 withholding of removal and CAT relief. Y.C., 741 F.3d at

19 335.

20 Motion to Reopen: Christianity Claim

21 The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Ren’s

22 motion to reopen because, as with his CDP claim, Ren commenced

5
1 his practice of Christianity after his arrival in the United

2 States and did not submit persuasive evidence showing that

3 Chinese government officials “are (1) aware of his

4 [religious] activities or (2) likely to become aware of his

5 activities.” Hongsheng Leng, 528 F.3d at 138; see also INS

6 v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05 (1988) (reasoning that movant’s

7 failure to establish a prima facie case for the underlying

8 substantive relief sought is a proper ground on which the BIA

9 may deny a motion to reopen). Ren’s evidence of the Chinese

10 government’s awareness was again a letter from his wife. The

11 BIA was not required to credit that letter. See Y.C., 741

12 F.3d at 332-34. Moreover, the country conditions reports do

13 not demonstrate a pattern or practice of persecution or

14 torture of ordinary churchgoing Christians in Ren’s home city

15 of Tianjin. The reports reveal targeting of religious

16 leaders, elders, and businesspeople and surveilled

17 underground church members, but they do not reflect

18 persecution or torture of ordinary churchgoers like Ren. See

19 Hongsheng Leng, 528 F.3d at 142. Accordingly, Ren

20 demonstrated neither that Chinese officials are aware or

21 likely to become aware of his U.S. practice of Christianity

22 (and would therefore single him out individually for

6
1 persecution) nor that there was a pattern or practice of

2 persecution of similarly situated Christians in Tianjin. See

3 Y.C., 741 F.3d at 332-34.

4 For the foregoing reasons, the petitions for review are

5 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal

6 that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED,

7 and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition

8 is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument

9 in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of

10 Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule

11 34.1(b).

12 FOR THE COURT:
13 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
14 Clerk of Court

7