In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant Salvatore DePetro appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Galasso, J.), entered May 4, 2001, as denied his motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and the cross claim insofar as asserted against him.
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, with costs, the motion is granted, the complaint and the cross claim are dismissed insofar as asserted against the appellant, and the action against the remaining defendant is severed.
The instant action arises out of an alleged three-vehicle collision involving the plaintiffs, the appellant, and the defendant Howard Sherman. It is undisputed that Sherman’s vehicle struck the appellant’s vehicle from the rear while the appellant was stopped in heavy traffic on the Southern State Parkway. According to the plaintiffs and the appellant, the appellant’s vehicle was then propelled into the rear of the plaintiffs’ vehicle, which was directly in front of him. Sherman, however, claimed that the appellant’s vehicle never struck the plaintiffs’ vehicle. Following discovery, the Supreme Court denied the appellant’s motion to dismiss the complaint and the cross claim insofar as asserted against him. We reverse and grant the appellant’s motion.
“It is well established that a rear-end collision with a stopped vehicle creates a prima facie case of liability with respect to the operator of the moving vehicle, unless the operator of the moving vehicle comes foiward with an adequate, nonnegligent explanation for the accident * * * If the operator of the moving vehicle cannot come forward with evidence to rebut the inference of negligence, the operator of the stationary vehicle is entitled to summary judgment” (Bustillo v Matturro, 292 AD2d 554, 555; see Harris v Ryder, 292 AD2d 499, 500; Santarpia v First Fid. Leasing Group, 275 AD2d 315; Cerda v Parsley, 273 AD2d 339, 340; Leonard v City of New York, 273 AD2d 205).