Action commenced in July, 1850, in the Superior Court of the city of New York, for a libel, alleged to have been published by the defendants of and concerning the plaintiff. The defendants in their answer denied
The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment, on the ground that the demurrer, notwithstanding its commencement as a demurrer to the whole answer, was in effect limited by the subsequent clauses to the special justification attempted to be made by the answer, and that the Superior Court, in passing upon the demurrer, must have so held, or the demurrer could not have been sustained.
That the general denial of the publication of the libel therefore remained, and the admission of its publication, contained in the part demurred to, must be regarded as stricken out by the allowance of the demurrer.
Other exceptions in the case, relating to the measure of damages, were not passed upon.
(S. C., 8 N. Y. 173.)