v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Origel-Candido v. State, 114 Nev.
378, 381, 956 P.2d 1378, 1380 (1998). Keys to the stolen Ford F350 were
found on Hano's person during the search incident to his arrest for the
theft of a red Ford F250, which he conceded having stolen. The F350's
owner did not willingly give the keys or any right of possession to the F350
to Hano. Both trucks were stolen at night, false license plates were used
to conceal each theft, and distinguishing exterior accessories were
removed from each stolen vehicle as evidence of a common plan to steal
Ford F-series trucks.
The jury could reasonably infer from the evidence presented
that Hano constructively possessed the white Ford F350 with knowledge
that the vehicle was stolen. See NRS 205.273(1)(b); cf. Webster v.
Woodford, 369 F.3d 1062, 1072 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that a robbery
victim "clearly had constructive possession of the car at the time he was
attacked by virtue of having the keys to the vehicle"); United States v.
Brett, 872 F.2d 1365, 1369 & n.3 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that possessing a
key establishes dominion or control to impute constructive possession and
noting that "every other circuit to address this issue agrees that the holder
of the key, be it to the dwelling, vehicle or motel room in question, has
constructive possession of the contents therein"); People v. O'Dell, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 116, 120 (Ct. App. 2007) ("Possession of recently stolen property
itself raises a strong inference that the possessor knew the property was
stolen; only slight corroboration is required to allow for a finding of
guilt."). Circumstantial evidence is enough to support a conviction. Lisle
v. State, 113 Nev. 679, 691-92, 941 P.2d 459, 467-68 (1997), holding
limited on other grounds by Middleton v. State, 114 Nev. 1089, 1117 n.9,
968 P.2d 296, 315 n.9 (1998). Although the evidence was not
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
2
(0) 1947A ex.
overwhelming, we conclude that sufficient evidence was present for any
rational trier of fact to find Hano guilty of possessing the stolen Ford
F350.
Hano argues that the district court abused its discretion in
refusing to admit the judgment of conviction of a certain person because
this evidence would have been relevant to his alternative-perpetrator
defense. "A district court's decision to admit or exclude evidence will not
be reversed on appeal unless it is manifestly wrong." Archanian v. State,
122 Nev. 1019, 1029, 145 P.3d 1008, 1016 (2006). "[R]elevant evidence" is
any evidence that "[tends] to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable."
NRS 48.015. The record, however, reflects that two witnesses for the
State acknowledged that the purported alternative perpetrator was a
convicted car thief and this point was never challenged. As the alternative
suspect's prior conviction was not disputed, admission of the judgment of
conviction would not make the individual's status as a convicted car thief
more probable, especially insofar as it would be of consequence to the
disposition. Further, to the extent that Hano sought to introduce the
judgment of conviction to show that the alternative suspect acted in
conformity therewith, that evidence would be inadmissible under NRS
48.045(2). We conclude that the district court was not manifestly wrong in
excluding the judgment of conviction.
Hano argues that the district court should have ordered a
mistrial sua sponte when the jury foreman reported that the jury was not
unanimous on the F350 count and that the holdout juror was firm and
sincere in his position. The district court has discretion to determine
whether to order a mistrial, and we review such a determination for an
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
3
(0) 1947A
abuse of that discretion. Rudin v. State, 120 Nev. 121, 142, 86 P.3d 572,
586 (2004). If the defendant does not move for a mistrial, the district court
must find that manifest necessity compels a mistrial to permit retrial
without violating double jeopardy. Id. Hano did not move for a mistrial,
and his counsel declined to object to the jury's continued deliberation. The
district court asked the foreman whether the jury might be able to reach
unanimity and directed deliberations to recommence after the foreman
acknowledged that further deliberations might be successful. The jury's
subsequent unanimous verdict suggests that it was not irreconcilably
deadlocked. Thus, we conclude that the district court properly exercised
its discretion. See Benson v. State, 111 Nev. 692, 698, 895 P.2d 1323, 1328
(1995) (concluding that trial judges must not "foreclose the defendant's
option until a scrupulous exercise of judicial discretion leads to the
conclusion that the ends of public justice would not be served by a
continuation of the proceedings" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Hano argues that Nevada law should be changed by limiting
adjudication as a habitual criminal to violent criminals. The adjudication
as a habitual criminal is "subject to the broadest kind of judicial
discretion." Tanksley v. State, 113 Nev. 997, 1004, 946 P.2d 148, 152
(1997) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The habitual
criminal statute does not classify the type of felony convictions necessary
to trigger its application. NRS 207.010. Hano does not cite any authority
compelling this court to change state law or invalidate NRS 207.010. We
note that Hano has been convicted of four prior felonies and, thus, was
subject to adjudication under the large habitual statute. NRS
207.010(1)(b). We conclude that the district court did not abuse its
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
4
(0) 1947A
discretion in imposing its sentence and deny the request to change Nevada
law on habitual-criminal adjudication.
Having considered Hano's contentions and concluding that
they are without merit, we
ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED. 1
P. O.
Parraguirre
,J
),coli-c2k I its Cl.
Douglas Cherry
cc: Hon. Jerome Polaha, District Judge
David Kalo Neidert
Attorney General/Carson City
Washoe County District Attorney
Washoe District Court Clerk
'Han° requests resentencing by a different judge if he is granted
relief on any of his claims. As we perceive no error by the district court,
resentencing is not warranted, and we deny this request.
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
5
(0) 1947A
Hano (David) v. State
Combined Opinion