J-S49042-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
FRANKIE LEE HEARNS
Appellant No. 426 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Order Entered January 6, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
Criminal Division at No: CP-09-CR-0004486-1985
BEFORE: OLSON, OTT, and STABILE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED OCTOBER 14, 2014
Appellant, Frankie Lee Hearns, appeals pro se from the January 6,
2014 order dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief
Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affim.
The trial court, sitting as fact finder, found Appellant guilty of first
degree murder, robbery,1 and related offenses after a two-day bench trial
that concluded on February 27, 1986. The trial court imposed a sentence of
life imprisonment for murder and a concurrent ten to twenty years of
imprisonment for robbery. This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on
January 22, 1990. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance on
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1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502 and 3701, respectively
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appeal on October 31, 1990. Appellant did not seek review in the United
States Supreme Court.
On May 31, 2012, Appellant filed the instant PCRA petition, his first.
Appointed counsel filed an amended petition on June 24, 2013. On
November 20, 2013, the PCRA court filed its notice of intent to dismiss the
petition without a hearing. On January 6, 2014, the PCRA court entered
orders dismissing Appellant’s petition and permitting counsel to withdraw
pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and
Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
This timely appeal followed.
The PCRA court found that it lacked jurisdiction because Appellant’s
petition is untimely and none of the PCRA’s timeliness exceptions apply. The
PCRA provides:
b) Time for filing petition.
(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second
or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date
the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the
petitioner proves that:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the
result of interference by government officials with the
presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or
laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of
the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that
was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States
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or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period
provided in this section and has been held by that court to
apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b). Section 9545’s timeliness provisions are
jurisdictional. Commonwealth v. Ali, 86 A.3d 173, 177 (Pa. 2014).
Since Appellant’s sentence became final prior to the 1995 amendments
to the PCRA, Appellant had until January 16, 1997 to file a timely first
petition.2 Appellant filed his pro se petition more than 12 years late.
Appellant’s pro se brief offers no argument to support the applicability
of any of the PCRA’s timeliness exceptions. Rather, he sets forth three
issues he concededly raises for the first time on appeal. Appellant’s Brief at
5.3 Since the PCRA court correctly found that it lacks jurisdiction over
Appellant’s petition, we affirm the order on appeal.
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2
As our Supreme Court explained:
The 1995 amendments to the PCRA provided that a first-
time PCRA petitioner whose judgment of sentence became final
on direct appeal on or before the effective date of the
amendments could file a first PCRA petition within one year of
the effective date of the amendments (January 16, 1996). See
Section 3(1) of the Act of Nov. 17, 1995 (Spec. Sess. No. 1) P.L.
1118, No. 32. Thus, as a ‘Grandfather Clause,’ every prisoner
who had not previously brought a petition for collateral relief,
could file a first petition by January 16, 1997, and said petition
would be timely without regards to the date of final judgment.
Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylor, 753 A.2d 780, 782 n.2 (Pa. 2000).
3
The PCRA court correctly observes in its opinion that Appellant was 19
years old at the time he committed the offenses and therefore is not eligible
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/14/2014
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(Footnote Continued)
for relief under the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Miller v.
Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). In Miller, the Supreme Court held that
mandatory life imprisonment sentences are unconstitutional as applied to
juvenile offenders. Id. at 2469. This Court has refused to extend the
holding in Miller to persons more than eighteen years old at the time of the
offense. Commonwealth v. Cintora, 69 A.3d 759, 764 (Pa. Super. 2013),
appeal denied, 81 A.3d 75 (Pa. 2013). Moreover, our Supreme Court has
held that Miller does not apply retroactively. Commonwealth v.
Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2013).
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Com. v. Hearns, F.
Combined Opinion